子育て、受験、大学、教育その他の井戸端会議

o 誕生時：　　遺伝 （インプット前のフォーマットとして）
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o 幼児期：　　才能 ＝ 遺伝 x 環境（親子のコミュニケーション、家庭環境からのインプット）
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o 小学生期：　才能 ＝ 遺伝 x 環境（学校での学びやコミュニティ社会からのインプット）
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o 中高学生期：能力 ＝ 才能 x やる気（学びに対する）
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o 大学生期：　能力 ＝ 才能 x やる気 （学び＆アウトプットに対する）
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o 社会人：　　成果＝　能力 x 考え方　（自分の社会で望む方向と社会の要請の一致度）



上記に関して、最近ＴＶ対談（Ｅテレ）を聞いていて腑に落ちた話がありましたので、書いてみます。


今でしょ！で有名になった東進の林修氏の話です。
彼の生い立ちから始り、小さい時から読書に親しみ、文１に入学し、一流企業に就職し社会人となる。ここ迄は、よくある話ですが、
それからエリートコースから離脱し、ひとり投機家の道に入り結局勝負に敗れ、予備校講師の道に入る。
そこで自分が一流になるために現代国語の講師になることを選び、頭角を現し現在に至る。


面白いポイントはふたつ、


1) 投機家の道で結局撤退することになったが、ここでの身を切る経験を通じ、観察力、洞察力、勝負勘を得て、生きる力を養った。（これは私の勝手な解釈）


2) 林氏が長年優秀な受験生を教え観察して来て見い出した共通の要因が、「３歳から５歳まで位までの幼児期での親子のコミュニケーションのあり方が徹底的にその後の能力に影響を与えている。」ということでした。多弁で陽気な林氏ですが、この点を勝負師の眼で強調していました。



この点は林氏自身も、私の子育てからの経験からも、そうだろうと感じますが、少しパターン化して考えてみました。


幼児は、環境から膨大な情報をインプットし、心身共に成長をする。
膨大な情報の中で子供が自分にインプットしていくのは、安心と安らぎを与え、心を許せる親を通じてが一番。


誕生時は遺伝による真っ白なフォーマット状態の脳に、データや思考のためのインフォメーションをインプットすることで成長をする。


そのイメージは、


　　能力＝Ａo x ∑｛ C1x(C2/C1)x(C3/C2)x....xCn/C(n-1)｝
　　　 ≒　Ao x (γn)のn乗

　　Ｃn：インプットして身につける情報のチャンク（Cn ＞C(n-1)）
　　 γn：Cn/(n-1)の相乗平均のイメージ、チャンクを大きくする指数、.　γn>1
　　 n : チャンクを大きくする学習機会の回数、



横軸に誕生から成人までの時間軸を引き、縦軸に常識でイメージした能力の指数を取ってみると、
誕生時（横軸：０才）の始点から、指数関数的に学習能力が上がるイメージとなります。
この関係から、ずっと将来（成人位迄）の能力の到達点を高くするには、
この幼児期の能力の立ち上がりの高さが、その後の指数関数的な能力の伸びに徹底的な影響を与えることが分かります。
（仕事で、大きなプロジェクトのプログレス管理でも、この立ち上がりが上手くいく入念な計画と準備が大切です。）


能力を上げるには、単に断片的なデータだけインプットしても効果はあまり無く、チャンクを大きくしγ＞１を大きくすることを繰り返していくことが胆です。そのためには、人の感情が入り込み、幼児は親からの愛情を感じながら安心して多くの情報を吸収して学びを初め、良好な親子関係と環境が子供の興味、好奇心を育み、自分で貪欲に吸収するようになる。それでγとｎが大きくなるサイクルと習慣が出来る。この幼児期のサイクルが将来の成長の大きな要因となっている、と林氏は帰納的に指摘したのです。


　　　 　

興味があって、読める方はどうぞ。

Sony has made money making Hollywood movies and selling music. That profitable part of the business is what Daniel S. Loeb, an American investor and manager of the hedge fund Third Point, wants Sony to spin off to raise cash to resuscitate its electronics business.


But as Mr. Loeb pressures Sony executives to do more to revive the company’s ailing electronics arm, some analysts are asking, Why bother?

Sony, it is suggested, might be better off just selling insurance.
Or just making movies and music. But not electronics.

A new report from the investment banking firm Jefferies delivered a harsh assessment of Sony’s electronics business. “Electronics is its Achilles’ heel and, in our view, it is worth zero,” wrote Atul Goyal, consumer technology analyst for Jefferies, in the report, released this week.

“In our view, it needs to exit most electronics markets.”
The maker of the Walkman and the Trinitron without electronics? What would it do?
Although Sony sells hundreds of products as varied as batteries and head-mounted 3-D displays, it so happens that Sony’s most successful business is selling insurance. While it doesn’t run this business in the United States or Europe, Sony makes a lot of money writing life, auto and medical policies in Japan.
Its financial arm accounts for 63 percent of Sony’s total operating profit last year. Life insurance has been its biggest moneymaker over the last decade, earning the company 933 billion yen ($9.07 billion) in operating profit in the 10 years that ended in March.

Sony’s film and music divisions, which produced hits like the Spider-Man movies and “Zero Dark Thirty” and recorded musicians like the cellist Yo-Yo Ma and the electronic music duo Daft Punk, have contributed $7 billion to the company’s bottom line over the last decade.

In that time, Sony’s electronics division has lost a cumulative $8.5 billion.

Hardly Sony’s crown jewels, experts say.
“The problem is that the board is still absolutely focused on fixing electronics,” said Kouji Yamada, a visiting professor at Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo and research director of Mission Value Partners, a Sonoma, Calif., investment company.

Sony’s chief executive, Kazuo Hirai, said last Wednesday that its board would consider Third Point’s proposal, even as it emphasized that the discussions were preliminary and that it had not set a time for a response.

But to a small band of analysts, Mr. Loeb’s prescriptions for Sony are shortsighted, merely milking the company’s profit-making content business for good money to throw after the bad.

As proof of the untenable future facing Sony’s electronics, critics point to its televisions and smartphones. Competition is intense, and in cellphones Sony remains a bit player. Even where it is more successful, in digital cameras or game consoles, it is struggling to stay abreast of stronger companies.

Sheer lack of managerial attention could soon start to hurt Sony’s insurance and entertainment divisions, Mr. Yamada warned. Sony Financial Holdings, a publicly traded company of which Sony owns 60 percent, has been underperforming its peers on the Tokyo stock exchange. Its share price has risen just 4 percent this year, compared to a 36 percent increase in shares of its rival, Dai-ichi Life Insurance.

And in the entertainment business, where alliances and tie-ups are starting to dominate strategy, Sony’s film and music units could be slowed by having to deal with a board that sits in Tokyo and does not have its hand on the pulse of a fast-moving industry, Mr. Yamada said.

“Maneuvering three completely different industries, that’s too much,” Mr. Yamada said. “These should all be separate companies.”

Sony maintains that its varied units make up a coherent whole. But the history of how it acquired its hodgepodge of companies suggests otherwise.

Sony’s co-founder, Akio Morita, first got the idea of buying a finance company on a trip to the United States in the 1950s to promote the company’s new transistor radio, according to an official recounting of its corporate history. On that trip, Mr. Morita was stunned by the sight of Chicago’s skysc[削除しました]rs, especially the Prudential Building that dominated the Chicago skyline.

“Why would a life insurance company have such an enormous building?” Mr. Morita marveled. “One day, we will also establish our own bank or financial institution and build a building like that.”
Mr. Morita’s wish was finally granted in 1981, when Sony started a life insurance venture in Japan with Prudential, the large American insurance company. Perhaps disappointingly, Sony Financial Holdings has its headquarters on the fourth floor of a nondescript midrise building in Tokyo.

Sony’s acquisitions of Columbia Pictures and CBS Records in the late 1980s got a lot more attention. Mr. Morita, a co-founder of Sony, and another executive, Norio Ohga, had long contended that content was crucial in promoting Sony’s expanding electronics universe, first wading into music with a venture with CBS Records in 1968.

But infighting between hardware and movies hindered that objective from the start, as did misaligned incentives that led Sony to wrestle with how to build devices that let consumers download and copy content without undermining sales at its music labels or film studios.

“Sony has tried to make this strategy work for a long time,” said Gerhard Fasol, president of the Tokyo technology consulting firm Eurotechnology Japan, “But it’s never really worked. Each part would be better competing on its own.”

Insurance never had that conflict. Sony’s 4,100 “Lifeplanners” would visit homes and offices to offer advice and make sales. Sony also runs a Web-only bank, Sony Bank, which accepts deposits and offers mortgage products, investment trusts and foreign-exchange margin trading.

On Wednesday, Mr. Hirai defended the company’s continued focus on electronics. “Electronics has a future. And it is in Sony’s DNA,” he said at a corporate presentation. “It is my mission to revive it.”

There are some glimmers that Sony is finding its way again, even as Apple and Samsung widen their lead. Sony’s sleek new XPeria Z smartphone has received generally rave reviews. Photography buffs have called its high-end, full-frame RX1 camera the most advanced compact camera.

“Not so long ago, we had despaired at Sony’s ability to ever again produce stellar products (especially when faced with duds like the Dash alarm clock and the Rolly music player),” Damian Thong, Tokyo-based technology analyst at Macquarie Securities, said in a report published Thursday.

“Yet we now have had a consistent run of beautifully designed, technologically advanced, class-leading products,” Mr. Thong said. “We think these products hark back to Sony’s glory days.”

Last quarter, Sony was back in the black, but its electronics division continued to lose money.

＞But infighting between hardware and movies hindered that objective from the start, as did misaligned incentives that led Sony to wrestle with how to build devices that let consumers download and copy content without undermining sales at its music labels or film studios.




なるほどね。矛盾を抱えて身動きできなくなったということですね。保険で稼いでいるというのは何とも・・・・・・・・・。これでは技術陣が役員になる必要はないわけだ。


引用有難うございました。　ソニーの抱えている問題がよくわかりました。

成程、ここにも、ひしめき合って、動きが取れなくなり、風を終えなくなり効率を落とす風車の構図が！　

成程、ここにも、ひしめき合って、動きが取れなくなり、風を追えなくなり効率を落とす風車の構図が！　

農協も　保険業で稼いでますから、マネーゲーム安定収入の保険業に至るのですかねえ。通信産業もそうですが　いかに安定的に収入を得るか・・ですか。

生保事業も、取り扱う商品が掛け捨て保険だけで確率計算で済むなら経営上のリスクは低いが、

生保は損保と異なり個人向け商品が主流で、貯蓄性機能セットの商品じゃないと売れないので巨大資産を預かることになり、その資産の金利逆ざやリスクを負うのであろう。また、少子高齢化で資産は減少するのだから、ダウンサイジングリスクもある。

もはや、生保事業が安定収益を生む時代とは言えまい。

成人教育さんの生保ビジネスモデルはバブル期までで、今は国債運用で逆ザヤリスクはない水準だし、レガシーもコンバージョン済です。一時払いを取っても生保があまり儲からないというのはあるけど。